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It is a commonly held view that International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), adopted by the 
European Union in 2005 and by other jurisdictions, compounded the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis. Application of 
the IAS 39 rule that governs loan-loss provisions and extends mark-to-market valuation of assets meant 
that when credit prices fell sharply in 2007 and assets were revalued using the new lower prices, it triggered 
a need for institutions to raise capital by selling assets, which pushed prices down further, causing more 
revaluations and more selling in a vicious circle. Mark-to-market volatility added to this unstable dynamic by 
keeping new buyers away. Fair value accounting rules are pro-cyclical and can contribute to the systemic 
disappearance of liquidity.1 The price of assets if they were to be sold immediately fell substantially below 
the price of the same assets if they were to be held to maturity or for some time period beyond the crisis. 
This liquidity premium was no longer a fraction of a percentage point, but tens of percentage points.
A number of observers have concluded that mark-to-market accounting should be suspended during a 
crisis. On its own, I believe this initiative would further weaken incentives for responsible lending in the 
good times. Nor would it solve the problem in bad times. The pro-cyclical use of market prices is not the 
preserve of accounting standards –it also lies at the heart of modern ﬁ  nancial regulation. 
Financial crashes are not random. They always follow booms. Offering forbearance from mark-to-market 
accounting or other rules during a crisis, yet using these rules at other times, such as during the preceding 
boom, would promote excessive lending and leverage in the good times. This asymmetry would contribute 
to more frequent and severe crashes. Second, crises are a time where a rumour becomes a self-fulﬁ  lling 
prophesy, as panic and fear spread. It is, arguably, not the time to generate a rise in uncertainty by changing 
accounting standards. There is room for a revision to the application of mark-to-market rules, but not a revision 
based on relying on the messenger’s every last word in good times and shooting him in the bad times. 
But the mechanisms that lead market participants to greet price declines with sell orders have not all to 
do with value accounting. Current prices, including spot and forward prices, play an important role in the 
market risk and credit risk management systems approved by ﬁ  nancial regulators. Risk limits and sell 
orders are triggered in response to a rise in price volatility and/or a fall in price. The very philosophy of 
current banking regulation –risk sensitivity– is about incorporating market prices into the assessment 
and response to risk. It should be no surprise that if prices, both prices for current and future delivery,
are pro-cyclical, then placing an increasing emphasis on price in the management and regulation of risk,
will lead us to systemic collapse. This article examines the role of valuation and systemic liquidity and argues 
that an approach to how we apply mark-to-market accounting and market prices or risk that is driven more 
by an economic view can improve the systemic resilience of the ﬁ  nancial system. 
NB: Professor Avinash D. Persaud is Chairman of Intelligence Capital Limited, a ﬁ  nancial advisory ﬁ  rm, trustee of the Global Association of Risk Professionals and 
Professor Emeritus, Gresham College.
1  See A. Persaud and J. Saurina (2008).ARTICLES
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FROM BANK FINANCE TO MARKETS FINANCE
The zeitgeist of ﬁ  nance over the last decade was 
the “marketisation” of banking: the shift from bank 
ﬁ  nance to market ﬁ  nance.2 Loans were originated 
and securitised by banks, rated by agencies and 
then relocated to investors. A cynic might say that 
a better description of what went on was regulatory 
arbitrage. Risks were transferred, on paper at least, 
from the regulated sector to the unregulated sector.3 
But it is important to recall that bank supervisors, 
especially in Europe, welcomed the “marketisation” 
of banking risk. They looked favourably on a process 
that appeared to distribute risks away from a small 
number of large and systemically important banks 
to a large number of investors. In the defense of 
regulators it should be pointed out that at the time, 
and not for the ﬁ  rst or last time, ﬁ  nancial institutions 
had not proved to be terribly good at managing 
risk on their balance sheet. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, a US based bank regulator would have 
had the Latin American debt crisis, the Continental 
Illinois collapse4 and the Savings & Loan disaster5 
ringing in his ears, each threatening widespread 
dislocation if tax payers money were not liberally 
spent or put at risk. 
The marketisation of banking required the greater 
use of market prices in the measurement and 
control of bank risks. During quiet or normal times, 
market-based ﬁ   nance appeared to offer greater 
liquidity, lower risk premium, and more sophisticated 
and nuanced risk management.6 This was also more 
conducive to increased transparency and frequency 
of reporting which was viewed as reducing the 
opportunity for fraud and increasing the opportunity 
for market discipline to inﬂ  uence bank behaviour. 
In the minds of bank supervisors all this reinforced 
the view that “marketisation” was the future of 
banking –and the future was bright. It is tempting 
to forget today but the marketisation of banking was 
not so much a conspiracy of the gnomes of Zurich 
as the gnomes of Basle. It was part and parcel of 
the approach to banking embedded in the European 
Capital Requirement Directive and the new Basle 
accord on capital adequacy of internationally 
systemic banks (Basle II).
It would appear the regulators were blinded by 
this vision of the future. The principal reason why 
we regulate the banking system over and above 
standard corporate regulation is because markets 
fail. When  markets failed with respect to credit 
risk, the pre-eminent role of market price in the 
measurement, reporting and control of risks, ﬁ  rst led, 
as the price of risk overshot on the downside, to a 
redoubling of imprudent lending, and later, as the 
price of risk overshot on the upside, to systemic 
collapse. Value accounting played a role in that for 
sure, but the use of contemporary prices of risk 
was more pervasive than the accounting of losses. 
If accounting was based on historic costs, but we have 
bank regulation that incorporates current market 
prices as an input in risk assessments and spawns 
market-sensitive risk systems in the operation of 
banks and in their assessment of lending to others, 
then the pro-cyclical effects we observed would have 
been similar. However pleasing it might be, we cannot 
blame the liquidity crisis entirely on the accountants. 
We can blame it on a mode of thinking about ﬁ  nancial 
risk that the accountants, bankers and regulators 
have all followed. There had been warnings before 
that the marketisation of risks contained a Faustian 
bargain: greater liquidity, lower risk premia and 
the appearance of sophisticated risk management 
in quiet times, at the expense of systemic liquidity 
when markets were under stress.7 The gnomes of 
Basle largely brushed these warnings aside. 
2 I  ﬁ  rst heard the term, the “marketisation of ﬁ  nance”, as well as separately the term “macroprudential” risks from one of the leading experts in this ﬁ  eld, 
Claudio Borio. 
3  Professor Charles Goodhart makes the important point that one of the problems with the originate, rate and relocate model is that many banks were too greedy to 
relocate the risks very far and often put them into their own bank sponsored structured investment vehicle (SIV) or hedge fund. Indeed, the collapse of Bear Sterns 
started with a collapse of a Bear Sterns hedge fund.
4  The Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company was at one time the seventh-largest bank in the United States as measured by deposits. In May 1984, 
the bank became insolvent due, in part, to bad loans purchased from the failed Penn Square Bank N.A. of Oklahoma—loans for the Oklahoma and Texas oil boom 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s.
5  The Savings and Loan crisis was the failure of 747 Savings and Loan associations (S&Ls) in the United States in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The ultimate cost 
of the crisis is estimated by a ﬁ  nancial audit of the Resolution Trust Corporation set up to rescue the S&Ls, was around USD160.1 billion.
6  One of the problems of Basle 1 was that it did not take a nuanced view of risk, but allocated risk between crudely deﬁ  ned buckets and over time it was felt that 
banks were “gaming” these distinctions to take more risk than it appeared. 
7  See Eatwell and Persaud (2008); Persaud (2000).ARTICLES
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One of the consequences of making market prices 
central to the management and control of risks 
and capital is that when markets fail and liquidity 
disappears, the authorities are left with no option 
but to intervene to set a ﬂ  oor in the market price 
of assets they would not normally purchase. 
The marketisation of banking has been associated 
with a switch in the role of the central bank 
from lender of last resort, to buyer of last resort.8 
This reason alone is sufﬁ  cient for the Banque de 
France and other members of the European system 
of central banks to pay more attention to the 
macro-prudential aspects of regulation. 
LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS OF THE MICRO-STRUCTURE 
OF NEW BANKING
The focus of banking regulation has been 
historically on identifying good practices at banks 
and making these practices a standard for others to 
comply with. Protagonists of Basle II oddly boast 
that it better aligns regulatory capital with what 
best banks are doing anyway. This patently does 
not address the social externality. Because of the 
liquidity transformation and the quasi money of 
bank deposits, banking is systemic. A focus by 
banks’ on their private interests will lead them 
to an underinvestment in systemic stability. This 
is a glaring and damning omission from banking 
regulation, but it is also a well-traversed subject 
in the economics literature.9 What I would like to 
explore further is the systemic liquidity effects of 
using market prices in the measurement, reporting, 
control and trading of risk. 
To appreciate the problem it is important to 
understand that ﬁ  nancial market liquidity is not 
about how big a market is, but how diverse it is. If a 
ﬁ  nancial market has two people in it, but whenever 
one wants to buy an instrument the other wants to 
sell it, it is a very liquid market. If a market had one 
thousand people in it, and they are all using the best 
practice valuation, risk-management and accounting 
systems and the same prudential controls based on 
public credit ratings, so that when one wants to sell 
an instrument in response to these systems, so does 
everyone else, it would not be liquid. At any one 
time there will only be buyers or only sellers; you 
need both for liquidity. This market is far bigger than 
the two-person market, yet it is thinner in terms of 
systemic liquidity. 
This is not an unfamiliar result in the literature on 
markets and systems. Any system in which market 
participants have the same tastes and use the same 
information will collapse. Try modeling any market 
in which the market participants behave as if they 
are one.
An inclusive ﬁ  nancial system has natural diversity in 
it. A pensioner, a young saver putting aside savings 
for a distant future, an insurance company and a 
charitable endowment, all have different investment 
objectives and different capacity for risks and these 
should be reﬂ  ected in different valuation and risk 
management systems. For example, an illiquid 
5-year bond backed by good collateral would be a 
risky asset for an investor funded with overnight 
money, but a safe asset for an institution with no 
cash commitments over the following six years, 
like a young pension fund. The risk management, 
valuation and accounting system that the institutions 
with overnight funding should use, should also be 
different than the one a long-term investor should 
use. The trend however for the same transparency, 
valuation, accounting and risk management rules 
reduces this natural diversity and increases systemic 
fragility. Some of the special investment vehicles 
(SIVs) that were forced to sell assets in the credit 
crunch, adding to the turmoil, were forced to do 
so, not because their funding dried up, but merely 
because they were using the same accounting, 
risk and prudential rules that the banks used even 
though they had a different and longer-term funding 
structure than the bank as a whole. 
One of the key lessons of the crisis is that a critical 
factor in systemic risks is funding liquidity. When 
the system freezes, those with short-term funding 
topple over. Those with long-term funding are the
system’s stabilisers. They are risk absorbers. 
However, by using common mark-to-market 
accounting, valuation and risk rules we do not 
make any distinctions between those with a 
funding liquidity issue and those without. We do not 
distinguish between risk traders who are short-term
8  I was led to this idea by Professor Willem Buiter who was one of the ﬁ  rst to write about central bankers becoming buyers of last resort. 
9  See Persaud (2008).ARTICLES
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and risk absorbers who, as a result of long-term 
funding liquidity have a capacity for market and 
liquidity risks. This absence of any distinction at the 
regulatory and accounting level and therefore the 
absence of any encouragement of risk absorbers led 
to the disproportionate growth of risk traders.10 This 
has worsened the systemic liquidity and resilience 
of the system. 
The key problem with the originate, rate and 
relocate model is that risks were transferred to a 
varied group of investors, who may have structurally 
different objectives, but through common valuation, 
accounting and risk systems and prudential controls, 
they in fact behaved as one investor. We ended 
up with a greater spread across legal entities, but 
less diversity. Spreading risk from a few disparate 
players to a large number of players, who behave 
homogenously, concentrates risk. 
We have highlighted the importance of diversity in 
ﬁ  nancial liquidity, but heterogeneity is also about 
the quality of lending in a way that casts a poor light 
on the “originate, rate and relocate model”. A good 
bank is one that lends to those that others do not, 
because of their superior knowledge of the credit. 
It is one that does not lend to those that others do, 
because of their superior knowledge on the credit. 
The “originate, rate and relocate” model does 
away with the advantage of superior proprietary, 
particular, knowledge in the name of common 
standards. Banking is done using common, public 
data, and on the basis of public ratings. If banks are 
not incentivised to know credits well, they will not 
invest in doing so. Elements of this can be found in 
problems in the subprime mortgage market. 
The trend of common standards is actually championed 
by the banks under the guise of equal treatment. 
Their interest is to reduce any advantage others may 
have in the ﬁ  nancial system and allow them to set up 
investment subsidiaries even though their capacity 
for long-term investment risk is low. However, if 
some activities are treated differently by regulators, 
because they have a different built-in capacity for 
risk, perhaps through a genuinely different funding 
structure, then preserving these differences would 
support systemic liquidity. Equality of treatment 
would do the opposite. Accounting, valuation, risk 
management and transparency standards, and the 
equality of treatment are all generally good, but it 
must be understood that in some cases there is a 
trade-off between search liquidity in the good times 
and systemic liquidity and macro ﬁ  nancial stability 
in the bad times. If standards are a force for more 
homogeneity in the ﬁ  nancial system then we must 
think again about applying them to everyone. 
LIQUIDITY IMPLICATIONS OF BROADENING 
“RISK-SENSITIVE” REGULATION
The crisis has been an occasion for renewed calls for 
the greater regulation of independent hedge funds and 
private equity ﬁ  rms. This is especially so in Europe. Our 
analysis so far points to three issues in consideration 
of the greater regulation of these institutions. First, 
“alternative investors” did not play a pivotal role in 
the crisis. The credit crunch centred on the banks 
and the banks own in-house investment vehicles. 
Second, spreading these common rules across from 
banks to hedge funds, private equity ﬁ  rms, pension 
and insurance ﬁ  rms and others while continuing to 
ignore the distinction between risk absorption and 
risk trading, will make the ﬁ  nancial system even less 
safe. It is within this group of investors that some of 
those with long-term funding –the natural stabilisers 
of the ﬁ  nancial system– reside. 
Where hedge funds and more recently private 
equity funds contribute to worsening systemic risks 
is through their use of leverage. Hedge funds and 
investment banks in general, are far more leveraged 
than commercial banks.11 When things go wrong 
de-leveraging has systemic and contractionary 
consequences. However, hedge funds do not 
generally generate leverage on their own. In large 
part they get leverage from the commercial banks. 
It is therefore possible to regulate the systemically 
important part of what these institutions do, by 
regulating the way commercial banks give them 
leverage. This would be a far more effective form of 
regulation of institutions that for a variety of reasons 
are often domiciled in offshore locations and where 
their principals are footloose. 
10  See Persaud (2007).
11  See Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008).ARTICLES
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In the 2007/8 credit crunch, one of the systemic 
issues was that the supply of leverage to non-banks 
is regulated by the commercial banks, in a 
homogenous manner, reﬂ  ecting the way they are 
regulated. The common rules that turn on and off 
leverage from the commercial banks to hedge funds, 
investment banks and private equity ﬁ  rms and the 
common approach that these rules take to valuing and 
managing risk is a major source for a reduction in the 
diversity of behaviour and the increase in ﬁ  nancial 
fragility. (This is also an important example of where 
mark-to-market risk systems, echoing those being 
applied on the banks, are driving the instability, rather 
than fair value accounting systems). Where hedge 
funds have been a point of stress over the past twelve 
months it is often as a result of weakness in a market, 
causing its counter-party bank, using its internal, 
short-term model of risk and value, to cut leverage 
to a fund which is then forced to off-load assets on 
to a weak market, causing more market weakness 
and more forced sales. This is not a mechanism for 
reducing risks but spreading risks. The regulation being 
proposed to extend regulation to these counter-parties 
of banks is about reinforcing these systemically risky 
processes not disrupting them. 
The solution to these issues is two-fold. First, 
capital requirements should be counter-cyclical 
and this should regulate the ﬂ  ow of leverage to bank 
counter-parties. Second, regulators should resist 
calls for equal treatment by the banks and make 
a distinction between those ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
whatever they are called, that have short-term 
funding, less than 12-24 months say, and those that 
have longer-term funding. Those with short-term 
funding would be required to follow bank capital 
adequacy requirements. Those with long term 
funding, may receive an exemption from this regime. 
They will be required to provide disclosures to the 
regulators that make the regulators comfortable that 
they do not have a funding liquidity risk, but they 
are not required to follow the capital regime. Instead 
they are required to follow a long-term solvency 
regime that takes into account long-term valuations, 
but through a level of disclosures about the assets 
and third party pricing that limits the opportunities 
for fraud. This would focus regulation on systemic 
activities and it would incentivise long-term investors 
to behave like long-term investors. 
LIQUIDITY, RISK ABSORPTION AND PENSION FUNDS
There is an understandable instinct that wishes 
to shield pension funds from risk. But of course 
pension funds can only generate returns for their 
members by taking some risk. The issue therefore 
is not how to stop pension funds from taking risk, 
but how to support them taking the right risk. It is 
my contention that regulation is pushing pension 
funds to take the wrong kind of risk and exposing 
them to inappropriate danger. In thinking about 
what the right kind of risk to take is it is important 
to understand that there has not one kind of risk, 
but several and that “riskiness” has less to do with 
instruments and more to do with behaviour. 
As we have discussed above, a “risky” instrument 
held by a bank may be a “safe” instrument if it is held 
by a pension fund. There are broadly three types of 
risk: market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk. The 
way to diversify market and liquidity risk is through 
time. The way to diversify credit risk is actively 
across different types of credit. A young pension 
fund has the ability to earn the market and liquidity 
premium, but not clearly the credit risk premia. 
They should therefore invest in high quality credits 
with poor liquidity or assets with strong long-term 
prospects but much short-term volatility. 
What they should not do is buy highly liquid 
instruments and low volatility instruments with 
large credit premia. And yet this is the route they are 
chased down by accounting and regulatory standards. 
A pension fund required to match the duration of its 
assets to its liabilities, mark-to-market its assets, and 
earn a high yield to limit contributions is inexorably 
led down the path of buying liquid instruments with 
poor credit. In buying liquid instruments they are 
paying up for a liquidity that they do not need and 
in poor credits they are earning a risk premia they 
do not have a natural capacity to earn as they do not 
have ready access to active hedging of credit risks. 
The person who loses from this unnatural asset 
allocation, is not the consultant, actuary or manager, 
but the pensioner. 
In a similar vein banks have been pushed towards 
the wrong kind of risks. A bank has short-term 
funding. It therefore has little capacity for liquidity ARTICLES
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and market risks. However, it has much capacity for 
credit risks as it is an expert in credit origination and 
through its origination activity it is able to actively 
source and hedge across a variety of credit risks. 
Yet, what do banks do today? They sell their credit 
risk to pension funds and they fund private equity 
and hedge funds that are effectively taking liquidity 
and market risk. 
Both of these examples of inappropriate risk taking 
–pension funds eschewing illiquid instruments and 
banks pursuing illiquid ones– lead to a net reduction 
in systemic liquidity. Pensions funds are not there 
to buy assets that have fallen sharply in price and 
banks run into trouble in stressful times when they 
pull lines on private equity and hedge funds that 
force them to sell assets. 
CONCLUSIONS AND A NEW SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK
The marketisation of banking and the pre-eminent 
role of market prices provides a coherent system – if 
you include the necessary intervention of central 
banks ever so often. Indeed, in the responses to 
the current crisis from lobby groups for bankers 
or committees of regulators,12 there is little sign of 
an abandonment of this system. A stylised view of 
the system is as follows. Risks are to be marketised. 
This requires pricing or rating of debt and debt 
portfolios and market pricing in value accounting, risk 
management and banking regulation. This broadens 
the inclusiveness of ﬁ  nance, which helps to lower 
risk premia and supports “search” liquidity in quiet 
times. Search liquidity is the cost in terms of time 
and price of ﬁ  nding a buyer for a security most of 
the time when the ﬁ  nancial waters are calm and 
there are no strong, systemic, currents.13 Some 
assets exhibit better “search” liquidity than others. 
But every ﬁ  ve to seven years, markets fail. In the 
crisis, through the role of price in accounting and 
risk management and even ratings, declines in prices 
feed further declines in prices. Liquidity disappears. 
The government is inevitably forced to underwrite 
risks in the ﬁ  nancial sector for some period of time 
before calm breaks out, markets catch breath, and 
the cycle repeats itself. Some policy makers argue 
that the wider beneﬁ  ts experienced for seven years 
or so14 outweighs the costs of the year of crisis. There 
is a legitimate trade-off to consider. 
I am not convinced that the trade-off of improving 
“search” liquidity in quiet times in return for 
worsening “systemic” liquidity in stressful times is 
a good idea. Systemic liquidity is the cost in terms 
of time and price to sell assets at a time of strong 
systemic currents.15 Some markets exhibit better 
systemic liquidity than others. Today developed 
country ﬁ  nancial markets are large, but they offer 
poor systemic liquidity. 
The full consequences of the liquidity crisis, which 
started in 2007, have yet to be realised as this chapter 
goes to press. Estimates of the ﬁ  rst round effects 
of losses amount to around USD 250 billion in the 
middle of 2008 but are likely to climb.16 And then 
there are the likely and potentially more serious 
second round effects. During a surprisingly lengthy 
period from July 2007 through to July 2008, banks 
lost conﬁ  dence in other banks, hoarded liquidity and 
distanced themselves from each other. It is therefore 
likely that private individuals will have a lasting 
loss of conﬁ  dence in the banking sector, which 
would lead to a reduced willingness to use ﬁ  nancial 
instruments to save, with negative spillover effects 
for investment in the productive sectors. 
Recall that the housing market boom in the 
United States and Europe was partly a result of 
investors eschewing mutual funds after the dotcom 
bezzle of  1999-2001. It is a measure of public 
disillusionment with ﬁ  nancial markets when real 
estate agents are more trusted than fund managers. 
It would be reasonable to expect banks to respond to 
recent developments with a lower risk appetite and 
reduced lending which in turn would threaten levels 
of economic activity more generally. Forecasts of 
economic growth have been revised sharply lower 
during  2008. Initiatives to make the beneﬁ  ts of 
12  See, recent reports from the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), representing the views of regulators and the Institute of International Finance (IIF), representing the 
views of the large banks.
13  See Lagana, Perina, von Koppen-Mertes and Persaud (2006).
14  It seems more frequent to me. In the space of 20 years I recall the 1988-89 S&L crisis, the 1992-93 EMS crisis, the 1994-95 Tequila crisis, the 1997-98, Asian ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, the 1998 LTCM crisis, the 2000-01, Dotcom crisis, the 2007-08 Credit Crunch.
15 ibid
16  Public loans and gifted equity capital to Northern Rock alone already amounts to USD 100 billion.ARTICLES
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ﬁ  nance more inclusive will also likely fall victim to 
this new conservatism. Central banks have also paid 
a potentially hefty cost in terms credibility. 
This litany of woe above does not even include issues 
of moral hazard as the authorities make necessarily 
hasty efforts to preserve the ﬁ  nancial  system. 
Bad banks as well as good banks are saved by the 
rising tide of government guarantees. It is alleged 
that banks are using the opportunity of central 
bank offers to buy assets to ofﬂ  oad bad assets at the 
central bank while hoarding good assets they would 
normally repo at the central bank. This is rational 
private behaviour, but it was not the intention of the 
emergency liquidity assistance. 
There is also the issue of political economy. In 2008, 
taxpayers are underwriting risks, created by bankers 
who paid themselves substantial bonuses before 
retiring. There is resentment that these bonuses were 
often lightly taxed, offshore. It is understandable 
therefore that the political response to the credit 
crunch is partly fuelled by the moral outrage of voters. 
The clear and present danger going forward is that 
this, understandable, outrage leads to a regulatory 
response that is too distracted by the ethical failure 
of the private sector to deal effectively with the more 
systemic regulatory failure.17 The scale of the 2007/8 
credit crunch could have been avoided by central 
bankers and supervisors who had both sufﬁ  cient 
information and the necessary instruments to 
respond, but failed to do so for a variety of reasons. 
These reasons included an absence of political will, 
a convenient intellectual entanglement with the 
prevailing zeitgeist of ﬁ  nance and a general neglect 
of systemic liquidity. 
The current process of regulation is that we begin 
with the banks and regulate them for holding risk. 
Regulation is a tax. Like all businesses the banks try 
to avoid the tax by shifting risks to say, investment 
banks. So, we regulate the investment banks. Who 
in turn shift risk to pension funds and insurance 
companies or SIVs and hedge funds. So we plan to 
regulate these, but they will only shift risks to some 
other place. What is the logical conclusion of this 
game? It is that the system will be heavily regulated, 
but it will not hold much risk. Risk will instead have 
shifted and shifted until it has arrived at a spot where 
it can no longer be seen. This does not strike me as 
a good model. 
We saw an element of this during the current credit 
crisis. Banks shifted credit risks to off-balance sheet 
investments where they were not very visible. Basle II 
correctly addresses off-balance sheet instruments by 
requiring banks to hold capital against contingent 
liabilities that may arise from these off-balance sheet 
instruments. But while this responds to the speciﬁ  c 
issue of off-balance sheet instruments, it does not 
really deal with the more general problem that the 
old distinctions of instruments and institutions are 
less relevant today. What matters is whether an 
activity is systemic, not whether it is called a bank or 
an SIV. Activities where there is a mismatch between 
funding liquidity and asset liquidity are likely to 
be systemic, but those that are not can only play a 
systemically stabilizing role if they are not part of 
the same regime. 
A better model of banking regulation would be based 
on three pillars. 
The ﬁ  rst pillar of supervision would be about doing 
away with distinctions based on legal entities 
of banks or investors and instead, focusing on 
risk capacity of activities and systemic risks. In 
some regards this would be a broader regime 
–incorporating institutions, off-balance sheet and 
other investment vehicles not currently regulated– 
but also a more focused regime. Those institutions 
with little funding liquidity (like a traditional bank) 
have little capacity to hold market and liquidity 
risk and should follow a capital adequacy regime. 
In calculating risk-adjusted assets under the capital 
adequacy regime, short-term measures of value 
and risk, mark-to-market accounting and high 
standards of transparency would apply. This would 
be pro-cyclical, but this issue should be addressed 
explicitly by the second pillar. 
Those activities with long-term funding liquidity 
(like a traditional pension fund or endowment 
fund) can be exempt from the capital adequacy 
regime in return for disclosures that satisfy the 
regulator that this is appropriate and adherence 
to a new “solvency regime” that allows institutions 
to use long term measures of valuation and risk 
17  It is argued that this was the fate of efforts in the United States in 2001-2002 to respond to the major corporate accounting scandals, which culminated in the 
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in determining and reporting their solvency. This 
approach will be attacked by banks for creating an 
unlevel playing ﬁ  eld, but it seeks to deliberately 
support the natural diversity in the ﬁ  nancial 
system and supports the systemically beneﬁ  cial 
role of risk absorbers.
The second pillar of supervision should be about 
putting the credit cycle back at the heart of the capital 
adequacy regime. Capital adequacy requirements 
should rise and fall with the overall growth in 
bank assets, not least because measurement of 
the value and risk of these assets are pro-cyclical. 
Contra-cyclical mechanisms face tough political 
resistance and they should be supported with clear 
rules.18 They should be formulated closely with the 
monetary authorities. 
The third pillar of supervision is about investor 
protection. Issues of transparency and disclosure 
are really about investor protection not liquidity and 
this means re-emphasizing the depth of disclosure 
relative to its frequency. Institutions that take 
in depositors’ money should also be required to 
have some minimum, transparent level of deposit 
insurance, which is provided privately, in large 
part. This may serve to reduce the moral hazard of 
deposit insurance. 
These three ideas should form the basis of efforts 
to reform current banking regulation. This crisis 
like almost all crises before was associated with 
embezzlement and fraud, especially in the brokerage 
of mortgages in the United States and perhaps also 
in the selling of securities, but even if there were no 
fraud, the crisis would still have happened. It was 
an inevitable consequence of modern ﬁ  nance, its 
regulation and the sad neglect of systemic liquidity 
by regulators. While there is a limit to what we can 
do about the ethical standards of bankers, I hope
I have shown that there is much we can do to 
facilitate or destroy systemic liquidity. 
18  See Goodhart and Persaud (2008).ARTICLES
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